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INTRODUCTION
The interest of the public in large industry is growing,
not only in dollars invested, but in numbers of persons holding
the stoc>C8 and securities of our immense, and in many cases, un-
wieldy corporations. But with this diffusion of ownership, there
has followed the loss of control by the actual owners, and worse,
a loss of any means of knowing the financial condition of the
company which is using their capital. Of course, the stockholder
is usually, but not always, presented with statements purporting
to set forth the "financial condition." Very little analysis
is required of the average report to determine that it does not
present the facta that the stockholder or investor have a right
to know. The problem is stated by Lewis H. Haney: ". . . . for
is not the house in which over three-forths of our industry is
carried on infested with disease? In a democratic country, hun-
dreds of thousands of citizens in their economic relations are
living in an oligarchy. Corporations, for the most oart, have
ceased to be 1 little republics' in which the shareholder citi-
zens govern through democratically elected representatives, and
too often these shareholders are nere ignorant pawns in a game
of high finance,—their shares the chios of a gigantic poker game.
What is the trouble?" 1
The reasons behind this misuse of the rights of the
public stockholder are many and are closely interlocking. Back
1. Buainess Organization 8nd Combination, p. 575.
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of the entire problem lies the fact that there are forty-eight
sovereign states issuing charters under their individual laws.
In many instances these laws are drawn for competitive purooses.
Thus, with such " chart er-mor.gering" states as Delaware, New Jer-
sey, Maine, Arizonc, °nd Nevada always trying to attract pro-
moters, little wonder that corporations secure so much freedom
and go beyond the control of ownership. We find, as a result
of these laws, many kinds of stock: with vsrying rights and priv-
ileges attached. There is oar 8nd no-pcr stock:, part icioat ing
and non-participating stock:, connaon and preferred stock, voting
and non-voting stoc<; each carrying with it some special priv-
ilege or lack of some inherent right of ownership.
The promoter has only to devise an idea end he has at
his disposal states competing for the right to grant him a char-
ter with any loop-hole he may desire for himself if the plan
should not prove to be as profitable a 6 his prospectus would in-
dicate. "The vicious element in our natural life is contributed
by the ingenious gentle.nen who manufacture pretty printed cer-
tificates to ta ce away from the people the prosperity they have
earned.
Corporations that are just coming into existence are
not the only offenders; in fact, they are only a very small mi-
nority. Abuses of the public are found in old and well-established
companies. Ownershio 1 s rights to dividends and of subscription
to new issues of stock have been abused and forgotten. Proxies
2. Hurdman, Frederick H.—Some Questions on No-Par-Value S+ock.
The Journal of Accountancy, January, 1925, p. 558*

are obtained to be used against the beet interest e of the voters
who grant them. Owners who have only a minority interest have
been treated much like "The Red-headed Step-child."
With the increasing distribution of the voting stock,
a corooration cnn be controlled by an ever decreasing percentage
of the outstanding shares. "It is a well known fact in American
finance that, if the majority shares are scattered, a rather
small minority of the stock held by an individual shareholder, or
a little group of shareholders wording together, can control the
corporation almost as surely as if they held an absolute majority
of all the stock outstanding."
Published statements fail to convey the facts of the
status of a company for any or all of several reasons. The New
York Stock Exchange and other markets for stocks and securities
have exerted a favorable influence on these reports by maintain-
ing certain standards that must te met by all companies whose
securities they list. Even then, the reports thnt are published
have been known to vary materially from those presented to the
exchanges. Perhaps this influence outweighs the fact that in-
vestors are often -aislesd by mani oulations within these markets
but how is the outsider to know that a ri6e or fall in a stock
is due entirely to "corners," "short selling," and other inside
manipulations? How can he determine, in the face of quoted prices,
the actual value of his stock?
Statements are sometimes published with the view of
5« Lyon, W. Hastings—Corooration Finance, p. 78.
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discouraging and driving out minority intereete. No stockholder
wishes to hold stock in a company thst continues to show a loss
year after year. If he can be led to believe that his comoany
is operating at a los9, when it has actually made enormous profits,
the price of +.he stock can be forced abnormally low so that the
"insiders" can purchase it far below its actual value.
Any seemingly innocent organization may be so heavily
over-capitalized that it is almost impossible to earn profits
large enough for a dividend on its co.anon stock after interest
is oaid on bonds and mortgagee and the preferred stockholders
have been satisfied. TVie over-capitalization is due largely to
the complaints of 'he public in the past that dividends were so
large as to be out of proportion to interest on investment. The
railroads offer the outstanding examples of over-csDi tali nation
because, rother than cut their rates in prosperous times, they
issued more stock. Thereby, their profits were divided over more
shares and caused less demand for loweri.ig of rates since div-
idends were less per share. Now, in times of depression and with
competition, they find it impossible to esrn orofits to pay a
dividend equal to ordinary interest on the par value of their out-
standing stock.
Watering stock has been a favorite method of the finan-
cier in securing subscriptions to new issues of stock and in
publishing an optinistic report for the public, or to cover a
deficit on the ualance sheet. Various means are resorted to,
most notable of which are: writing up good-will, over-valuing

fixed assets and inventories, failing to recognize adequate
depreciation, and carrying valueless receivables with an in-
adequate reserve.
The management of the comoany, wishing to deceive the
stockholder for their personal benefit, may, under the cloak of
conservatism, fail to show the true status of the business. Large
hidden reserves may be found in .nany organizations. This is
accomplished, among other methods, by under-valuing fixed assets,
carrying excessive reserves, omitting important assets, writing
off good-will, and failing to show ownership in other comoanies.
Pyramiding by holding companies makes it most difficult
to prepare a true statement even when the utmost care is taken
and where there is no intention of misrepresentation. No con-
solidated state aent can be analyzed intelligently without the
statements of +he sub-companies. Ye 4 , seldom do we find a con-
solidated statement accompanied by statements of subsidiaries.
Many times the percentage of ownership in subsidiaries is not
disclosed.
The very nature of accounting makes it possible to
show anything that is desired on a financial report, for account-
ancy can never be an exact science and all statements must be
based, to some extent, on the judgment of the auditor or person
responsible for their preparation. There is, at present, no
necessity for a report to have any connection whatsoever with
actual facts. It can be made to reflect anything that the man-
agement wishes the public to believe by the simplest of "book"
entries.
-5-

Owner ajp and control have become ao far aepa rated that
in relatively few cases does the person furnishing the capital
for an enterprise have any voice in ita management. The public
even seems to have loat interest in its business but there has
been nothing the people could do or learn, once they became
stockholders. Their interest has been unwanted and it has been
very expensive and reauired long periods in court for them to
get any part of what is rightly theirs. "The holding of meetinga
in small towns, the suprise, the resentment with which corporate
executives greet questions, and the policy of furnishing abbre—
4
viated, conundrum-like financial reports, discourage curiosity."
The case of the purchase and reorganization of Dodge
Brothers, Inc. in 1925 gives one of the outstanding examples of
many of the abuses of the corporate stockholder and the investor,
"And the feat of Dillon, Read & Co., the principal
purchasers, in shifting their investment to the public
within two weeks at a gross cash profit of $15*250,000,
while retaining for themselves all the voting stock of the
enterprise, can only be described as a startling piece
of financial legerdemain— . . . ."
"Dillon, Read & Co. proceeded immediately to re-
incorporate the Company in Maryland (on April 8, 1925),
and to sell to the investing public a sufficient volume
of the new Corporation' s securities to yield them a
handsome immediate cash profit, while yet retaining full
control of the enterprise. This they did in the follow-
ing manner; they realized §7^*250,000 in cash (gross,
without deduction for marketing expense) from the sale
of $75,000,000 of the Company's six per cent debenture
bonds, which were offered at $99 and interest; they
4. Weissman, Rudolph L.—Minority Stockholders. The American
Mercury, May 1950, p. XXVIII.
5. Seltzer, Lawrence, H.—A Financial History of the American
Automobile, p. 240.
-6

realized $85,000,000 more in cash (gross) from the 8sle
of 850,000 shares of no-par value, non-voting, prefer-
ence stock bearing cumulative dividends of $7 a share,
and 850,000 shares of no-par value, non-vot<ng, Class A
common stock, which were sold at the rate of one share
of each for a joint price of $100; and they retained for
themselves and their associates 650,000 shares of Class
A common stock end the entire issue of 500,000 shares
of Class B common stock, which latter class was given
sole voting oower in the Corporation. In other words,
the investing public, which sbsor-ed the offerings
with surprising alacrity, paid $159,250,000 in cash
for the bonds, oreferred stock, and 56.67 per cent
of the non-voting common stock of Dodge Brothers, Inc.,
while the promoters and underwriters compensated them-
selves with 57.5 per cent of the Corporation's entire
common stock, including all of its voting stock.
"The prospectuses issued by Dillon, Read & Co.
frankly declared that the oreference and common stocks
of the company were being issued ' almost entirely
against the established earning power.' Under ordinary
procedure, the balance-sheet of the Company would have
reflected this fact by containing a large valuation
for 'good-will' and other intangible assets; and such
a treatment would have afforded a minimum of deception.
Instead, however, the bankers took full advantage of
the opportunities for disguise made possible by the
legalization of 'no-par value' securities; and, as a
result, they were able to present an initial balance-
sheet for the Company that contained a valuation of
only one dollar for intangible assets. This they
effected by placing such arbitrarily low nominal val-
ues uoon the Company's capital stocxs as to reduce
the total nominal caoital liabilities to a figure con-
sonant with the value of the net physical assets. In
other words, instead of inflating property values by
the insertion of a large 'good-will' item, they deflated
the capital liabilities to only a fraction of their
market value. Thus, the preference and Class A common
stock sold to investors for $85,000,000 were carried on
the books at a total value of only $955,OOOi The
preference stock was given a book value of $1 a share;
the two classes of common stock, 10 cents a share.
Hence, while the asset side of the Dodge Brothers
balance-sheet is innocent of the deception supposed
to inhere in the inclusion of intangible items, the
liability side is highly (though not technically) mis-
representative of the true sta A e of affairs. Perhaps
one reason for the adoption Df this Drocedure was a
desire to minimize the apparent quantity of securities
obtained by the bankers for their promotion and under-

writing services: the 650,000 shares of Class A common
stock and the 500,000 shares of Class B common stock
that they received, constituting a clear majority of
the entire common-stock issues, were given a total
book value of $115,000."
Published statements are used, as far as possible,
as illustrative of the abuses of the stockholder and investor.
In some cases it becomes necessary to construct hypothetical
statements where no published statements are available for the
purpose desired. These statements are not chosen in an attempt
to make the picture any darker than is the actual case but are
representative of what may, or may not, be found in any published
report. These are the type of statement presented to the public—
and they are received, in most part, without orotest. "It has
long been known, not only by Barnum but all the multitude of his
successors, that the public will believe the label on the oack-
age in preference to a study of the contents. 'If it is in
print it must be so' is a rule followed by countless numbers who
would, no doubt, indignantly refuse to admit it. n ^
Many remedies have been suggested but few have been
actually attempted. Cumulative voting has attained more pop-
ularity than any other remedy but it has come far from solving
the problem. England has tried audits by stockholder interests
with marked success. The answer in America seems to be a com-
bination of several things. An adoption of the English practice,
with additions, would undoubtedly helo but with that should be
6. Ibid., p. 242-4
7. Couchman, ,Charles B. —Juggling Corporate Capital. Nation's
Business, November 1929, p. 45.
-8-

linked either a "Uniform Corporation Act" or, better still, a
requirement for incorporation by Federal Statute. Nor then
would the solution become entire without wholesome publicity
and the interest of ownership.
It is not the purpose of this work to formulate laws
as a solution to the proolem, b.it rather to point out the defects
of the present system, show its dangers, and indicate some remedies
that would help to correct the evils. To draw uo a code for
chartering and controlling corporations is the work of a legal
authority but there is an attempt to point out a few of the many
things it should include.
The intention in making this study is not to discour-
age the stockholder but it is an attemot to call his attention
to the abuse of his rights. It is hooed that it will assist in
arousing interest that is necessary before any constructive work
can be accomplished.
9

CORPORATE FINANCIAL MACHINERY
LAXITY OF STATE CHARTER LAWS.—Although New Jersey
was the first state to recognize, to any significant extent,
the advantages to be derived from the "wholesale" granting of
corporation charters, others were not slow in following the
lead. Delaware has now assumed the position of the most advan-
tageous state in which to secure a charter, but close competition
is found in Maine, Arizona, Nevada, West Virginia, and others.
"The business of issuing corporation charters to com-
panies to ply their trade in any part of the country has attained
mammoth proportions in Delaware, and it is a business that is
impressive and peculiar in at least one particular; it is per-
haps the only one in which a whole state, in its sovereign
capacity, engages, with great profit to itself and to certain classes
of its citizens, and with immense mortification and embarrass-
ment, financial and spiritual, to its sister states. It is
said that in Dover there is an average of over one hundred stock-
holders meetings a day and that on a single floor of a moderate-
sized office building in that city, there may be found the
2
"home office" of some twelve hundred corporations. " . . . .
corporations by the thousand can be found cruising under the
black flag of Delaware' s corporation laws in search of easy
money." A. P. Richardson, in an editorial appearing in The
1. Flynn, John T.—Why Corporations leave Home. The Atlantic
Monthly, September 1952, p. 268-9.
2. Ibid., p. 268.
5. Ibid. , p. 270.
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Journal of Accountancy, June 1929* says, "Such a law as that
in Delaware purporting to govern the management of corporations
seems to be almost wholly concerned with explaining what may
L
be done in contravention of what should be done."
Promoters from all parts of the country would not
congregate in Delaware to secure charters if there were not
epecial inducements offered to them. An analysis of these
"advantages" shows almost all of them to be possible means of
defrauding the public shareholder.
"Almost anything goes in Delaware, and here are
some of the things that go:
1. Directors need not be stockholders. A
collection of office boys would do just as well.
2. No officer or director need reside in the
S \* 8 t 6 • • » •
5« Directors meetings may be held outside
the state, but stockholders must meet there. This
is an important advantage to the promoters, for as
a prospectus from Delaware put 6 it, if stockholders
meetings were held in a populus place lice New York,
where so many stockholders would chance to live, a
good many of them might attend the meetings, if only
for curiosity. . . .
4. The directors may issue new stock end,
indeed, affect *he preference on old stock, without
the approval of the stockholders. They may make
by-laws without the aporoval of the stockholders.
• • • •
5. Better than this, the right to elect ell
or a majority of the directors may be limited to one
class of stockholders
6. Stock may be issued, not only for cash,
but for property, services, rights, and the product
of one' 8 brain; as an authority assures us. This
may be called the waterworks department of the law.
• • • •
7. Stock, of course, may be issued without par
value. This provision becomes deadly when it is
found provided that the no-par stock may be issued
from ti.ne to time at such terms and prices as the
4. A Dangerous Development of Corporation Laws, p. 446.
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directors may fix. They may issue a new batch of
stock to the public at one price, to the stockholders
at another, and to themselves at still another. It
ie within the power of the directors at any time,
under this provision, to dilute the property of the
stockholders, or, acting within the law, to rob tern
of their profits. This has actually been done on a
large scale in countless instances.
8. The baleful system of issuing rights and st ~ck
purchase warrants, so generally abused before 1950» i- 8
permitted under the D*laware law. This is another
method by which the directors and insiders are enabled
to gamble with the corporation's money without t'-king
any risk themselves
9. Less than a majority of the board may consti-
tute a quorum; in fact, provision may be made for alter-
nate directors. . . .
10. In Delaware a corporation can be conjured
into existence almost as fast as a magician can pro-
duce a bouquet of roses from his hat."
In other state statutes are found similar provisions
for chartering and governing corporations chartered under their
laws. In Arizona, "Stock may be issued for money, property,
or services. The fact that it may be issued for services may
be an important advantage. Directors meetings may be held out-
side the state. Connecticut laws provide for the following:
"Stock may be paid for in either cash or property. The judgment
of the directors is final with regard to the value of the prop-
erty for which stock is issued, exceot in case of fraud. Incor-
porators may be non-resident. Corporations may hold stock in
other corporations." 7 Maine offers inducements such as: "Stock
may be issued for property, cash or services. The judgment of
the directors is conclusive as to the value of the property—
5. Plynn, John T.— op. cit., p. 272-4.
6. Lough, William H. —Corporation Finance, p. 58.
7. Ibid., p. 58-9.
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alweys provided there is no evidence of fraud. Incorporators
and directors may be non-resident. Directors meetings may be
held outside of the state. The corporption may acquire stock in
other corporations
.
11 Under the Nevada statutes: "Incorporators
and directors may be non-resident. Stockholders and directors
meetings aay be held outside of +he state. Stock may be issued
for cash, property, or services. The judgment of the directors
is conclusive as to value of property, provided there is no
evidence of fraud. Action of the majority of the stockholders
or directors may be vslid without a regular meeting; that is,
there may be an informal meeting held, without any notice what-
o
soever being given." In New Jersey, which is perhaps Delaware's
closest rival, we find that: "Corporations may hold stock in
other corporations. Incorporators may be non-resident. Stock
may be issued for property or cash. Judgment of the directors
is conclusive as to velue of property. (No mention of fraud).
Directors meetings may be held outside of the state, if by-laws
so provide. Cumulative voting is permitted. Voting trusts
may be created."
CAPITAL STOCK.--To facilitpte the distribution of
ownership of a corporation, its capital is divided into shares
of stock. Each share represents a proportionate part of the
ownership of the enterprise and all the shares, taken collectively,
8. Ibid.
, p. 60.
9. Ibid., p. 61.
10. Ibid., p. 61.
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are known as the capital stock of the corporation. Becauee these
shares usually have a par value of $100, $50, $10, or some other
arbitrary figure, it has become a common fallacy for the public
to associate a share with a definite monetary value rather than
to accept it as a certificate of ownership.
The two major divisions of capital stock are common
and preferred. Each of these two types may be divided into
several classes with many combinations of rights as to income
and control, and of risk: of investment. Common stock: is owner-
ship in the corporation reDresenting an equity in the assets
after satisfying securities with a prior lien. It carries no
special privileges but may, if so specified, be deprived of
inherent rights of ownership, such as voting. Preferred stock
holds a preference over common stock in some one or more partic-
ular while, unless otherwise stated, it possesses the same
rights and privileges thst sttach to common stock. Ordinarily,
"preferred stock" means that this particular type of stock has a
preference as to dividends; that is, that the holders of this
stock must receive a specified rate on their holdings before
any dividends may be paid on common stock. Unless otherwise
provided, this dividend on preferred stock becomes cumulative.
If the stated rate is not declared and oaid in any year, it
becomes a claim on future earnings which must be met before any
dividend can be paid on common stock.
Preferred stock may or may not have a preference as
to assets on disolution. If this preference is given, the
-14

specified preference must be met before common stockholders ere
entitled to any share in the assets.
Non-participating preferred s^ock may be issued. This
means that, under the terms of its issue, this class of stock
receives no more then its specified rate—any balance going
entirely to the holders of other classes of stock. Thus, if
there ere outstanding 1000 shares of non-participating, 6%,
preferred stock of $100 par value and 1000 shares of common stock
and there is a net profit of $50,000 for the period, all of which
is declared in dividends, the ^referred stockholders will receive
$6000 while the common stockholders receive $44,000 or $44 per
share.
In order to more easily maintain control of a corpo-
ration by holding a small percentage of its stock, non-voting
stock may be issued. "All stockholders have the inherent rig t
to participate in the management of the corporation through vot-
ing for directors and on other jiattere. Non-voting stock may be
issued, however, and purchasers of such stock voluntarily surrender
their voting rights. . . . The vote may be apportioned among
several classes of stocc in any desired manner as long as at lesst
"11
one class of stock is vested with voting power. By this means,
it has become possible to disfranchise great numbers of stock-
holders. The reorganization of Dodge Brothers, Inc. (see pages
6-8) offers an excellent example of the majority of the stock-
11. Bonneville, Joseph Howard—Elements of Business Finance, p. 100.
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holders having no voice in the management of their corporation.
There are instances where non-voting preferred stock:
is given the right to vote w en dividends are in arrears for a
certain period but this right comes rather too late to remedy
evils that may have been the cause of failure to declare these
dividends. It is mucb like the case of allowing a prisoner a
new trial after he has served his sentence!
The advent of no-par stock in 1912 (New York) wee
heralded as a cure for all corporate abuses. It was, by erasing
the dollar mark from a certificate of stock, to correct the mis-
conception of the public that a share of stock represented its
par value. It was to be the means of stopping over-capitalization
and "stock-watering"; in fact, it was to be the "savior" of the
shareholder. No doubt, the proper use of no-par stooc would
have Droved most helpful but " . . . . No-pa r-stock law has been
12bo bandied about that it has lost all its virtue." It has not
removed the idea of the monetary value of a share from the minds
of the people; it has not stopped over-capitalization; nor has
it keot down "watering." There has, instead, been ooened a new
and larger field for defrauding the stockholder. Frederick H.
Hurdman says, "I do not believe that the use of no-par-value
stock has served to eliminate or reduce the over- valuation of
intangibles nor even served to warn the investing public against
12. Richardson, A. P.—A Dangerous Development of Corporation
Laws. The Journal of Accountancy, June 1929 * P» *&6.
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the assumption of an arbitrery value for the stock."
Since no monetary value is attached to no-par stock,
it can oe issued in any quantity es payment for property or serv-
ices and there is no recourse to the courts as is the case when
par-value stock is issued for assets. The value of capital stock
outstanding can, for the same res son, be placed on the balance
sheet at any figure the directors may desire. They .nay cover
losses, and even leave an appearance of profits, though an actual
loss was suffered for the oeriod, by an adjusting entry between
capital and surplus. Capital may be impaired by a dividend ; n
excess of accumulated earnings. "In other words, if $100,000 is
received by a corDorstion incorporated under the lsws of Delaware
in payment for capital stocic of no-par value, and if it hs s no
other class of stock, and the liabilities are, let us say, $10,000,
the directors may determine that $90,000 of capital is no longer
capital but ie now surplus, and they may, if they deem it expedient
or salutary, declare the full amount of $90,000 in the for?a of
lA
dividends to the stockholders."
Shares may be sold at such a low figure bb to encourage
speculation and promoters may retain large blocks for promotion
services (see pages 7-8). When stock may be sold at any price
determined by the directors, the shareholders may find that their
holdings have been materially reduced in value by the sale of a
15. Some Questions on No-Par-Value Stock. The Journal of Account-
ancy, January 1925, p. 18.
lb. Richardson, A. P.— op. cit., p. AA5.
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new issue at a price below its value. The directors may sell
stock to the oublic for $100 per share end, s week later, sell
similar stock to themselves at $1.00 per share!
No-par stock may permit the balance sheet to be grossly
misleading. "The use of no-par value stock tends to permit the
elimination from the balance sheet valuable information which
15
we have been accustomed to expect in the statement of corporations
.
*
Carl B. Robbins, in hie boo-c, "No-Par Stock," points out several
methods, with comments on each, used in showing no-par stock on a
balance sheet: (Stated capital $100,000, surplus $25,000)
HNo-par shares carried at the original issue orices:
Net Worth:
Capital stock, No-Par Value, 752 shares $75,000
Surplus 50,000
This statement is grossly misleading. . . .
No-par shares carried at an arbitrary figure:
Net Worth:
Capital stock, No-Par Value, 750 shares $ 1
Surplus 124,999
Taken together these figures show that the net -."orth is
$125,000, but separately they mean nothing. It is a
plain case of concealment of the actual situation. Such
figures cannot possibly be of use to anyone, unless,
indeed, they are used by the corporation to deceive its
creditors, its stoc cholders , a id the public. . . .
No-par shares carried at their book value:
Net Worth:
Capital Stocx, No-Par Value, 750 shares $125,000
(Surplus concealed)
No-par shares carried at market value:
Net Worth:
Capital Stock, No-Par Value, 750 shares $157,500
This method conceals the situation perfectly. It mis-
leads corporate creditors to the maximum. rt
RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERS.—With so many types of stock
being issued, each of which may soecify the divorce of the holder
15. Stockwell, Herbert G.—How to Read a Financial Statement,
p. 518.
16. P. 158-9.
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from some right of ownership, one wonders if there remains any
rights of the shareholder of so.ne of our large cor poretions
.
But, unless otherwise specified, the stockholder hee certain
basic right 8:
"1. To proportionate ownership in the undivided
assets of the corporation snd to a certificate stating
this ownership in shares.
"2. To transfer ownership of his shares.
"5» To receive dividends when earned and de-
clared by +he board of directors.
n 4. To inspect the corporate books.
ff 5. To subscribe, in proportion to his holdings,
to any new issue of 6tock.
n 6. To proportionate control through voting
power.
n 7« To vote on other questions affecting the
corporation property as a whole.
"8. To protect the corpora + ion agsinst wrongful
acts of a majority.
H 9« To restrsin ultra vires sct6 of the corpo-
ration. _
"10. To shere in the proceeds of dissolution."
There is no question as to the first two of these rights
for they seem to be the only ones which are not, in some instances,
found missing. Although the right to transfer stock remains with
the holder, the market may be so manipulated that it will be sold
far from its true value.
Dividends, once declared, are e claim against the cor-
poration but the declaration of dividends is left entirely to the
judgment of the directors. There is no means, except perhaps by
a lengthy and expensive orocess in court, of compelling any div-
idend whetsoever to be declared. •'Whether the corporation funda-
mentally needs to be fed up, or whether it could with benefit
17. Bonneville, Joseph Howard— op. cit., p. 90.
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stand a little bloodletting through larger dividends are each
matters for which the elected management must assume full re;-
eponsibility; but it mi^ht well profit, end the shareholders
certainly would do so, from an interchange of views uoon the
18
point." The practice of withholding dividends may be used to
encourage the sale of stock at a figure nuch below its value.
A stockholder is rarely allowed to inspect imDortant
books and records of his corporation. If he is permitted to
review any of the books, they are usually of minor importance
and little, if any, more is known than before they were inspected.
Even with all the books before him, the avertue shareholder ia
not qualified to reach any reliable conclusions, nor does he
have the time or inclination to mace an adequate study. This
is the work of a trained accountant and may require months with
a staff of assistants.
The modern tendency is to permit sale of new issues
of stock without giving present stockholders first ootion on
their Purchase. New issues are often brought on the market at
a price which means a bonus to those who purchase the stocc at
this orice. The holdings of old stockholders are decreased in
value by an amount equal to this bonus. This abuse is often much
more serious when stock is issued for property or services.
"The pre-emptive right of old stockholders to sub-
scribe pro rata to a new issue of sheres does not hold
in case the new shares are issued for properties or
18. Ripley, William Z.—Main Street and Wall Street, p. 1^9.
•20-

in caee the new issue is used as a bonus with other
stocks or bonds. Thus an unscrupulous board of di-
rectors may connive with associates in swindle by
issueing to such associates a bloc* of stock in ex-
change for properties the market value of which ie
considerably less than the market value of the stocc
issued therefor. Such fraud is not orecluded by the fact
that moet states require that no person may be a di-
rector of a corooration unless he bp a stockholder of
the corporation, for directors may be qualified legally
by the possession of but a few phares. A few stetee
hav« gone the extreme in this direction; the directors of
a Delaware corporation, for example, need not be stock-
holders." *9
No longer can it be said that a stockholder Loay exercise
power by voting. The largest stockholder of either the United
States Steel Corporation or the American Telephone & Telegraph
Company owns less then 1% of the voting stock and John D. Rock-
efellow controls Standard Oil Company of Indiana with only
20
14.5$ of its voting stock. Many st oc cholders have too little
interest to atte id meetings to vote their stock while othere,
living at such a distance from the place where the meeting is
held, cannot afford to attend. Anyone holding an in + erest in
the comoany can, with some effort and exoense on his Dart, secure
proxies from a great many of these shareholders. By the use of
these orox'.es (powers of attorney authorizing a person to vote
the st :>ck of another) control of a corporation may often be
represented by only a nmall percentage of voting ownership. This
practice is someti.aes made worse by taking proxies difficult to
ob+ain (reauiring notary seal) if few share voter, are desired and
19. Robbins, Carl B.—No-Par Stock, p. 70.
20. Means, Gardiner C.--The Separation of OwnershiD and Control
in American Industry. Quarterly Journal of Economics, No-
vember, 1951, p. 86
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making the process simple when many are desired.
Many instances, illustrating e variety of methods, may
be found where the minority is "crushed" by majority interests.
Accounts are juggled in every conceivable way and misleading
reports are oublished almost daily in an effort to discourage
and drive out small shareholders to the advantage of "insiders."
Dividends are passed, profitable lines of the business are trans-
ferred to subsidiary companies, secret reserves are established
and omissions are made on published statements. "Controversies
arising in connection with the conflicting rights of different
classes of shareholders illustrate the possibility of abuse of
power by a strongly intrenched majority. Under existing corpo-
ration laws the rights of minorit
. stockholders have too often
21
been secrificed." Relief by court action invariably comes too
late; the wrong may be corrected but the damage is seldom com-
pletely reoaired. In cases where full damages are granted, the
corooration, using stockholders' money, usually pays and there
ie no relief whatsoever for those who have disposed of their
holdings.
21. Ripley, William Z.—Railroads: Finance and Organization,
p. 104.

PUBLISHED STATEMENTS
WHY THEY FAIL TO CONVEY FACTS
Only a glance at many statements, published for the
purpose of informing stockholders as to the value of their
holdings and the activities of their company, reveals them to
be stinted and of little value for the ourpose for which they
supposedly were printed. This, it i s explained, is necessary
for competitive reasons.
"One marvels at the audacity of corporations
when they say that it is great injustice to them
to compel display of their profits. The relation
between state and corooration seems to have been
forgotten. Is not the corporation a thing crested
by the state for the very reason that the corporation
is an efficient producer? The state grant of oer-
miBsion to do business under the coroorate form of
organization with limited liability of participants
is justified on no other grounds. The child seems to
have bold mutiny in its heart when it comolains of
the operation of the only excuse for its creation
and existence. And the parent is apparently inti ni-
dated by the child's self-asserted rights and ai*- -
thority." 1
Scarcely ever can the average investor be expected to make an
intelligent analysis of the material with which he is presented
and in many instances the trained accountant can do no better
than make a guess as to actual facts. Intentional omissions
cannot be detected by the most experienced analyst and, where
methods of valuation are not given, no one can form any abso-
lutely reliable conclusions. Who can determine, from the state-
ment, what is included under such headings as "Securities,"
"Investments," and "Miscellaneous Assets?" The reader has no
1. Robbins, Carl B.—No-Par Stock, p. 117.
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means of knowing that by being "conservative," the balance sheet
is actually covering large secret reserves. Stockholders do
not need "conservatism" or "shock absorbers for lean years";
they need the facts and they have a right to know these facts.
Nor is there any means available to the stockholder and investor,
who is desirous of obtaining facts about his corooration, other
than these published reports. Even when no fraud is being
practiced, such statements give reason for suspicion that all is
not well and also leave an open door, at all times, for those
who have access to the secrets.
As to the "Profit and Loss Statement" (at times en-
tirely omitted from reoorts), the stockholder should know, at
least, the net sales, the cost of production, ooerating and
general exoenses, selling expenses, maintenance cost, depreciation
charges (how determined), end financial income and expenses.
Although, with these fscts, most stockholders may still be
unable and unqualified to form reliable opinions, they may
then take advantage of the judgment of competent experts who
will be better able to determine actual earnings.
MANIPULATIONS IN STOCK MARKETS.—By requiring readable
reports, the New York Stock Exchange and other stock markets
have exerted a favorable influence on the published statements
of corporations but it is not required that statements presented
to the markets and those prepare^ for the public be identical or
even similar. Nor are the stocks and securities of all corpo-
rations, whose stock is held publicly, listed on an organized
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market. Thus, regulations passed by markets cannot be extended,
by force of the market, to effect all stocks.
A recognized step in making a market for a new issue
of stock is to so manipulate the price of the Btock as to "gain
the goodwill of speculators and brokers and arouse expectations
2
of large profits." When this is done skillfully and secretly,
it is almost impossible for even the most experienced to ascer-
tain that the price is a result of manipulation. How is the
average investor to know that he is paying for a "trick of the
market" rather than actual value?
An excellent example of manipulation of stock prices
is found in the organization of the Oregon Railway and Navigation
Company:
"After the organization we s complete, the visible assets
of the Oregon Railway and Navigation Company did not
exceed $5*500,000, while the total liabilities amounted
to $21,000,000
"It will thus be seen that there were seven dollars
of liabilities for every dollar of assets, end the in-
trinsic value of the stock was reDresented by a minus
quantity of 20 per cent., having no positive value at
all. In other words, it wes 20 per cent, worse than
nothing.
"In spite of these facts, however, Mr. Villard had
the stock listed at the Stock Exchange, and through a
carefully prepared report, showing immense and un-
precedented earnings, he hsd the stock bulled up to
200."5
Wit'o "short selling," "pooling," and other devices used
by manipulators carrying the price of stocks far from actual value,
the "outsider" buys and sells as desire or necessity commands.
2. Lough, Williem H.—Corporation Finance, p. 254.
5. Clews, Henry—Fifty Years in Wall Street, p. 215.
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Regardless of the value of the stock, if he buys, he must nsy the
quoted price; if he sells, he must accept the conjectual price of
the market.
MINORITY INTERESTS.—In corporations making large pro-
fits, the majority may, for their personal interests, wish to
acquire more of the outstending stock. Since it is to their in-
terest to secure additional s'ock at the lowest Dossible figure,
various means are used to discourage minority interests and induce
them to sell their holdings at a price much lower than actual
value. In this sense, majority does not necessarily mean any
group holding 51% of the outstanding stock or even of the voting
stock outstanding but is interpreted as meaning any group holding
control of the corporation, whether by proxy voting, from the mere
fact that the stock is widely owned and not entirely voted, or
because a particular type of stoc-c is given the power to elect a
majority of the directors.
Directors have the power to determine when and if div-
idends are to be declared and the amount of any such distribution.
Value of stocc is largely determined by the income it oroduces.
If dividends are passed for several consecutive periods, the value
of the stock to the investor becoaes less for it is not producing
an income. The majority may, through the directors, pass dividends
and pile uo large undistributed surpluses and thus acquire the
stocx: of the minority at a very advantageous amount.
A subsidiary company may be brought into existence and
owned largely by the majority of the original company. The profit-
able functions of the original company may be transferred to the
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new corporation or contracts may be made whereby the subsidiary
malces most of the Drofits.
Excessive salaries may, for a period, be paid to exec-
utives in order to reduce profits or majority holders may become
executives and draw these exhorcitant salaries themselves. In
the same connection, improvements may be made and charged to
current exoenses to reduce Drofite.
Where it is desirable to discourege the minority of a
subsidiary, the holdin: comDany may demand payment of advances
from the subsidiary at a time that will prevent it from declaring
a dividend, due to its reduced cash position, although ample
profits were earned.
Some few cases may be found where oppressive tactics
on the minority are practiced openly but, to insure maximum
effectiveness and reduce the possibility of court proceedings
from the demands of the minority, the majority usually find it
convenient to cover their actions and intentions by false or
vague published statements. Even if they feil to deceive, they
do not give evidence of what is being done.
FALSIFICATION IN ORGANIZATION.—The internal organiza-
tion of many large corporations lenda itself to the publication
of statements that are vague, although not necessarily false.
They may be over-capitslized, have large issues of watered stock,
or have large secret reserves. The management may sponsor in-
adequate reports for various reasons, both for and against the
interests of owners. The income tax laws have, in some instances,
caused profits to be shown at as conservative a figure as possible,
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while unduly large profits are shown in other cases to facilitate
the sale of new issues of stocks. There may be a desire to write
off goodwill in times of orosperity which, if actually existing,
creates a secret reserve.
Whenever the actual value of the net assets (assets
less liabilities) of a company decreases below its outstanding
capital, the company is over-capitalized. Over- capitalization is
closely related to stock-watering and unless bonds or stocks are
sold at a discount (sale of stock at a discount is illegal), a
new corporation cannot be over-capitalized unless there is stock-
watering. A going concern may become over-capitalized by losses,
either from operations or unusual misfortunes such ss fire or
storm losses, and from inadequate provision fcr depreciation of
assets. The extent to which American coroorations are over-
capitalized may be seen by the number of stocks that continuously
sell far below their par value on stock: markets.
Railroada offer the outstanding examoles of over-
capitalization. Their managements find it impossible to pay
reasonable dividends on present capitalization although they might
be able to do so on original cost. This is largely the result of
stock dividends and reorganizations of the roads at various times.
Professor William Z. Ripley says, "Financial reorganization
offers a fruitful field for sn increase of capitalization irre-
spective of assets, whether for railroads or industrial corpo-
rations. Occa ssiona lly a company succeeds in emerging therefrom
with the same volume of outstanding securities with which it
went into bankruptcy. By far the larger number come forth saddled
28

with heavier issues then ever before."
A noteworthy example of industrial over-capitalization
is found in the case of the incorporstion of a small saw mill by
its owners:
"In many cases of capitalization a much larger
number of shares of capital stock have been issued for
oroperty than the actual value of that property. In
one case the owners of a sew mill worth §100,000 suc-
cumbing to the high-finance fever of 1901-1905, incor-
porated and iasued to themselves $1,000,000 worth of
full-paid capital stock in oayment of the property; they
took ten dollars of stock: at oar value for one dollar
of prooerty. They also aold a considerable portion
of the stock at $100 per share before the accounts
were examined and the inflated value discovered. "5
"Stock-watering" is the increasing of the capitalization
of a corporation without an equal increase in its assets. The
amount of water in the stock of a corporation is the excess of the
book value of its assets over the actual value of these assets.
Professor Ripley lists seven occassions when stock-watering may
occur: " .... in connection with construction; through replace-
ment of property; by division of an accumulated surplus; as a
concomitant of refunding; as an incident of consolidation; as a
feature of financial reorganization; and, finally, in connection
with the provision of new capital through issuance of shares or
bonds. "^
Stock-watering, as contrasted with over-capitalization,
which may not be intentional, is intentional 8nd, in most cases,
4f Railroads: Finance and Organization, p. 259.
5. Stockwell, Herbert G.—How to Reed a Financial Statement,
p. 508.
6. Ripley, Willism Z.— op. cit., p. 252-5.
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without defense. It is only a matter of writing up asset accounts
to balance any issue of stock desired. In an attemDt to earn
dividends on the watered issues, prices may be raised and compe-
tition invited, with a waste of investment. The public is induced
to purchase "gold bricks" and to pay enormous prices for stock
that largely represents "water."
In 1910, General Motors issued common stock of a par
value of $5,908,500 (besides $1,100,000 par value preferred stock
and $112,^50 in cash) for the practically worthless assets of the
Heany Lamp Company. This issue of common stock w&s represented in
1928 by more than 2,581,000 shares of the Corporation's common
stoc<c ($25) with a market of more than $520,000,000.7
Another, but less fortunate, esse of stock-watering is
found in the organization of the Middle West Utility Company by
Samuel Insull.® Insull organized the company, became president
of the comoany, and sold to the company, stocks amounting to
$550*000 which he owned in several small utility companies.
For these stocks snd a promise to pay $5*270,000, he received
the entire issue of six million dollars of common stock and four
million dollars of preferred stock. All the preferred and one
million of the common stock was then sold to the public for
$5*600,000 in order that the cash might be paid to the company.
Insull retained control of the company with five million dollars
of its common stock. The Middle West Utility Company then had
7. Seltzer, Lawrence H.—A Financial History of the American
Automobile, p. 228.
8. Flynn, John T.—Up and Down with Sam Insull. Collier's,
December 17, 1952, p. 21.

securities velued st $550,000 end cash of $5,270,000 but its
outstanding capital was- $10,000, 000. The books could not bal-
ance—more assets were needed--so the securities were Disced
on the accounts at an "arbitrary" figure to aake the difference..
A mere "write up" of the assets of some six million dollars!
When the actual net worth of a company exceeds the net
worth as shown on its balance sheet, a secret reserve exists.
This may be accomplished in two wpye: by understating assets or
by overstating liabilities. The most common method of cresting
a secret reserve is by malcing excessive cherges to deDreciation
of fixed assets. Other widely used methods arej writing down
fixed asset values, allowing excessive reserves for bad debts
and contingencies, under-valueing inventory, writing off exist-
ing end legitimate goodwill, and charging asset increases to
current operating expenses. The Bank of England is said to
own real estate with a value in excess of ten million dollars
9
which is entirely excluded from its balance sheet.
Such practices, in that they permit the showing of
balanced Drofits snd present means for covering unusual losses,
are often hailed as oraiseworthv and conservative. The fact
is overlooked that unsuspecting stockholders may be led to sell
their holdings at much less than value and that anyone knowing
the secret may benefit thereby. For those who are informed,
all that is necessary is to conceal profits and build up secret
reserves for a period to drive down the price of the stock and
9. Walton Accounting Series—Advanced Accounting, Lecture 52»
p . 1.
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then purchase it in the market, ^he next etep, of course, is
to reveal these reserves. Surplus is thereby increased and the
price of the stock rises and it is sold at a nice orofit. The
public is swindled but the entire transaction is within the
sanction of the law! However, reserves, correctly used, are
undoubtedly beneficial and are to be recommend -d but they should
be plainly shown and explained on every report. If there is
no ulterior motive, then why keep them secret?
The management may have various motives for publish-
ing "window dressed" reports. The policy of the company may
be known to only a few and, by the use of involved accounts,
the unprivileged are left at a totsl loss.
"Prior to the careful analysis of expense accounts,
prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission, it
was always possible to •skin 1 a road, that is to say,
to postpone the customary and in the long run neces-
sary outlay for maintenance. Savings thus effected
could be utilized for enlarged dividend disbursements.
On the strength of this showing, the speculators could
dispose of their holdings at a profit, and leave the
road practically gutted."^
The management, having interests in another comDany,
may promote the purchase of this company at a price much above
value. Contracts may be made whereby the management is benefited
or secret salaries or bonuses may be paid to officers and dir-
ectors. Each of these encourages the use of involved accounts
to conceal the facts from stockholders.
A certified public accountant made the following
observation:
"The methods employed for the purpose of giving
a wrong impression to the stockholders or the public
as to the company's condition as shown by the published
10. Ripley, William Z.—op. cit., p. 212.

balance sheet are almost innumerable, but I will cite
a few.
"Where the accounts are subject to audit and it
is desired to malce a good appearance at the date of
the balance sheet, the practice of borrowing a large
sum of money from brokers or bankers for a few days
is often resorted to. By this means, at the date of
the balance eheet the conroany has apparently a large
amount of available funis, though in point of fact
the loan is repaid a few days lster. In the same
way, where such a corporation as a loan and invest-
ment company finds itself holding securities of a
speculative character, such as mining stock, it is
quite customary to make a sale of these securities to
brokers a few days before the date of the balance
sheet, with the understanding that the company is to
repurchase them at the same price less commission for
the accommodation a few days later. In this way the
company avoids showing on its published balance eheet
any investments that are not of gilt-edged character,
and in both the instances quoted above it is very hard
for the auditor to find any grounds for refusal to
give an unqualified certificate to the balance sheet;
the condition is as stated by the accounts at the
particular date at which they are drawn up.
"Again, where it is desired to conceal from stock-
holders the fact that the company is making large pro-
fits or, on the other hand, incurring heavy losses, the
valuation placed unon investments in stocks and bonds
of other corporations or the valuation placed upon
merchandise on hand is often juggled, the officers of
the company constituting themselves the arbiters as to
what is really the actual value of such assets.
"Another window-dressing plan often employed is
to treat the balances due on current account from the
branch houses of the corporation as though they were
accounts receivable due from ordinary customers.
Goods on consignment are often similarly treated as
though they were accounts receivable and included in
the balance sheet at sale price under this caption
instead of at cost price.
ACCOUNTING—ITS NATURE AND MISUSE.—Accounting is a
prerequisite to large business. No business, except very
small organizations, could exist for long without some system
of accounts. Its value may be expressed by the difference
between our mammoth business structures and practically no
11. Lough, William H.—op. cit., p. 570-1.

business—the difference between large, nation-wide cor oorotions
and insignificant, one-man proprietorshios. But, when used
unethically, accounting Decouies one of the most deadly weapons
of industry. By i aproper entries, boocs of account and state-
ments can be made to show anything that is desired or, as is
often the case, nothing whatsoever. Tie oublic too generally
holds the idea that "because it balances, it is correct." Even
truth has many sides; a conserv tive view may be taken and the
condition shown as unfavorably as possible, while an optimist
will prepare a report which goes to the opposite extreme. The
responsibility does not fall on accounting as a science but on
those who are responsible for the preparation of the accounts.
Suppose a concern shows net earnings for 9 ye^r of
$8.00 per share of outstanding stock. This might be made up of
actual profits of $1.00 per share, a write-up of fixed assets,
inventories and goodwill of $4.00 per share, income from the
sale of capital assets of $2.00 a share, and an increase in sur-
plus from a reversing entry to sooie contingency account for $1.00
per share. Unless these fscts are brought out in the report,
the oublic is lead to believe that the company made normal pro-
fits for the period. On the other hand, suppose actual profits
amounted to $20.00 per share on the outstanding stock but that
the following took place. Goodwill amounting to $4.00 oer share
was written off against current income, reserve charges for depre-
ciation and doubtful accounts were arbitrarily increased by $2.00
per share, asset values were reduced by an amount equ&l to $4.00
a share, end unnecessary reserves for contingencies were set up

equaling $2.00 per share. The financial statements again show
a net profit for the oeriod of $3.00 per share and the cry of
the shareholders for dividends is not nearly bo loud as if true
profits had been shown. In the first supposition, the market
for the stock would be held above its value and shareholders
would, perhaps, receive a dividend reoresenting, in part, a
distribution of capital. In the second instance, the market
price of the stock would, in most esses, be held below actual
value while a reserve would be established to be drawn against
in lean years. It is a si.iple trick of accounting—incorrect
book entries!
HOLDING COMPANIES.—When any corporation holds the
majority of the stock of one or more other companies it is
known as a "holding company." It receives dividends from the
sub-comoany and votes its stock at stockholders' meetings of
the subsidiary for any advantage to the holding company. By
repeating this process of sub-company ownership, known as
"pyramiding," the parent company may secure control of numerous
companies with little or no additional capital outlay on its
own part. This is done as follows: Company A owns fifty-one
per cent, of the stock of Comoeny B which in turn owns fifty-
one per cent, of the stock of Company C. Thus Company A controls
Comoany C with actual ownership of only 25^% of its stock and
no capital exoenditure on its oart. Each time the process is
repeated, Company A secures control of another subsidiary but
with each repetition the percentage of actual ownershio required
diminishes by one-half of that owned in the immediately proceeding
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instance. By this method, control, as effective as that of
sole ownership, can be had with ownership of a very small pert
of the outstanding stock yf ^he comoany controlled.
Almost invnriably the report published by a holding
company contains onlv the consolidated statement of the perent
corporation and in many ceses the percentage of ownership in
subsidiaries is not given. The public is left to guess whether
there is fifty-one or one hundred per cent, ownership. Nor can
a stockholder obtain all the information in which he is inter-
ested without the full statements of 8 11 subsidiaries, "e can-
not determine the liquidity of his company or the amount of
surplus available for dividends.
The extent to which holding companies operate is
demonstrated by the pyramiding in railroad companies. Nearly
• ninety percent of the railroad mileage of the United States is
controlled by fifty-seven systems, the other ten per cent, being
largely composed of short, unorofitable lines. ^-^
SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP FROM CONTROL.—The parting of
ownership and control in our large corporations furnishes the
background for publication of misleading and inadequate reports.
Where the two are in conjunction, those interested in the facts
concerning the business ere able to obtain the information and,
except for tax and credit purposes, there is no motive for pre-
senting anything but facts in published reports. Although the
moral obligation of coroorate management to publish more infor-
mative reoorts increases as ownershio becomes widely diffused,
12. Clews, Henry— op. cit., p. IOA7.
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that obligation beco.aea more and more neglected. As the voice
of ownerahip becomea leae effective, the atockholder cornea to
be looked upon ae a neceaaary evil to be diaDosed of in the
ahorteat manner poaaible rather than ae an owner in the buaine88.
There ia a conapicuou8 abaence of information that will piece
him on e par with in9idere concerning fact8 a a to the company 1 a
financial operationa and condition. Aa long as these condition8
exiat, we cannot hope to find a change in the 8tatu8 of the
average publiehed report—it will continue to be vague, inad-
equate, and mi a lea ding.
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ILLUSTRATED STATEMENTS
EFFECT ON CAPITAL SET-UP
BALANCE 3HEET.—No financial report can be properly
interpreted without a correct belance sheet. It must be correct
in nomenclature as well as in amounts in the money columns if
it is to be really informative. To facilitate interpretation
and comparisons, prooer clessificet ion should be maintained.
Several good forms hsve been published, most notable of which
are those recommended by the Federsl Reserve Board and the
Interstate Commerce Commission, in an effort to oromote clarity
and uniformity in published statements but they have received
very little usage by unregulated organizations. Too much is
shown for them to be convenient for the use of many corporations.
As a rule, a short, conundrum-like balance sheet accompanied by
little or no exDlanation seems to be preferred. In some cases
it is even worse than that; the Semi-annual Statement of Opera-
tions of the American Locomotive Company, June JO, 1952, contains
no balance sheet whatsoever, although the stockholder is assured
that his company is in a "strong financial position" after a
deficit of $ 1,971,855. 08 is shown for the preceeding six months
(see page 56 )
.
For several years General Foods Corporation and Sub-
sidiary Companies have published a very scant Profit and Loss
Statement (see page 57) which is not accompanied by a balance
sheet.
The treatment of " goodwill" on statements has a marked
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effect on the capital of the company. Suppose a company with a
balance sheet es follows:
THE X COMPANY
BALANCE SHEET
Current Assets $500,000.00
Fixed Assets (net) 7Q0, 000.00
Deficit 150,000.00
Current Liabilities $500,000.00
Fixed Liabilities 200,000.00
Capital Stock 850,000.00
Total Assets $1,550,000.00
Total Liabilities
and Capital $1,550,000.00
This statement, because of the large deficit, will make an un-
favorable impression on stockholders so the directors decide to
value goodwill at $500,000.00 and it is written on the books
accordingly. (Of course, they may be conscientious and, rather
than merely write on goodwill, charge advertising and other cur-
rent expenses to such an account.) The statement will then make
a much more favorable impression on the sversge stockholder for
it will show a surplus of $150,000.00 rather than a deficit.
THE X COMPANY
BALANCE SHEET
December 51, 1952
Current Assets
Fixed Assets (net) 700,000.00
Goodwill 500,000.00
Total Assets
$500,000.00 Current Liabilities $500,000.00
Fixed Liabilities 200,000.00
Capital Stock 850,000.00
Surplus 150,000.00
Total Liabilities
$ 1,500,000.00 and Capital $1,500,000.00
The Consolidated Balance Sheet of the Chrysler Corpora-
tion and Subsidiaries, September 5°, 1929» shows "Good Will
$25,000,000.00"—more than ten per cent, of total assets. Julius
Kayser & Co. and Subsidiary Companies, Consolidated Balance Sheet,
June 50» 1950* shows patents, trade-marks, and goodwill at a figure
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of $5,644,000.00—almost eighty per cent, of their total earned
surplus of $7*587*560.91 and one-fourth of their total assets
of $22,581,980.55. The propriety of these figures is determin-
ed by whether or not they arose from actual capital outlay. If
they are the result of capital expenditures, they are proper;
if they reoresent only a book entry or opersting expenses of
prior oeriods, there is over-capitalization snd stock-watering.*
Writing off goodwill and other intangible assets, such
aa patents, copy-rights, and trade-marlce, is a favorite method
of creating secret reserves. Attention is called to the Balance
Sheet of Brown Shoe Company, -Lnc. as of October 51* 1951 (see
pages 4l-2) with respect to the valuation placed on lasts, pre-
paid insurance and licenses, and goodwill and patent rights.
Even the scrap value of the lasts of a company of this type is
far in excess of one dollar. Any under-valuation of assets
must reflect in a similar under- statement of the surplus of the
company.
General Baicing Company, in its annual report as of
December 26, 1951, shows H
1
Bond Bread,' Other Trade Namee, Trade-
Marks, Copyrights and Goodwill $1.00." In the accompanying
Statement of Profit and Loss and Earned Surplus—"Prooortion of
goodwill written off, together with disbursements incident to
capital readjustment $2,5^5,696.49" is a charge to earned
surplus. Further, in the Statement of Capital Surplus there is
a charge, "Goodwill written off, less amount charged to earned
surplus $4,295,697.25."
Liggett and Myers Tobacco Company, in its Balance Sheet
Applies only to operating statements. Capitalized excess profits
may properly be shown as goodwill for purposes of sale.
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BROWN SHOE COMPANY, INC.
ANNUAL REPORT
OCTOBER 51 et, 1951
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET
*4l-
ASSETS
CURRENT
:
Cash
Customers' Accounts Receivable,
After Providing for Doubt-
ful Accounts
Prepaid Purchases
Inventories: At the Lower of Cost
or Market Prices!
Finished Merchandise $5,159,268.40
In Process, Raw Material, and
Supplies 2,527,389.09
OTHER ASSETS:
Sundry Securities
Personal Notes (Secured) and
Sundry Accounts, Etc.
PERMANENT—At Book: Values:
Land and Buildings $2,165,562.29
Less Allowance for Depreciation 577,754. 56
Ma chinery $2, 816, 925. 74
Less Allowance for Depreciation 1 ,618,226.48
LASTS
PREPAID INSURANCE, LICENSES, ETC.
TRADE NAME, GOOD WILL, PATENT RIGHTS, ETC.
CONSOLIDATED
BROWN SHOE
and Subsid-
At The Close of Business
$1,148,798.76
6,525,506.20
19,598.47
5,686,657.49 $15,180,160.92
% 71,455.91
742,708.51 814,142.22
$1,585,607.95
1,198,697.26 2,784,505.19
1.00
1.00
1.00
$16,778,611.55
BALANCE SHEET
COMPANY, INC.
iary Companies
October 51,
LIABILITIES
CURRENT:
Notes Payable
Accounts Payable:
Purchases, Expenses, Etc. $ 667, 529.97
Employees' Savings Accounts 225, 7Q5»75 I
Accrued General Taxes
Reserve for Estimated 1951 Income
Taxes
CAPITAL:
Preferred Stock—7% Cumulative:
Authorized $4,557,500.00
Less:
Retired and Cancelled
$962,500.00
Held in Treasury 40,800.00 1,005,500.00 $ 5,554,200.00
COMMON STOCK AND SURPLUS:
Common Stock:
Authorized, 500,000 shares with-
out par value— Issued,
252,000 shares $5,455,655.54
Earned Surplus 8,651,542.09 12,065,177.65 15,599,577.65
NONE
891,055.70
59,200.00
229,000.00 $ 1,179,255.70
$16,778,611.55
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for the year ended December 51» 1928, shows "Brands, Trade-Marlcs,
etc., $40,709,711.21" while in a similar report for the year
ended December 51, 1929, "Good Will" replaces "Etc." and the value
shown for the account, "Brands, Trade-Ma rice, and Good Will" ie one
dollar. The Income Account shows this difference as a deduction
from surplus.
The Consolidated Balance Sheet of Eastman Kodak Co.,
and Subsidiary Companies as at December 26, 1951 (see pages 44-5)
shows "Good Will and Patents of Parent Company and Subsidiaries
—Nil." Perhaps the Surplus account would be larger if this
account were shown at actual cost less proper amortization.
Less information is to be found concerning depreciation,
depletion, and amortization, and their corresponding credits than
any other class of items on published reports. Not only the
amount of these reserves and of the current credit made to them
should be shown but also the method of determ'ning the amounts
must be explained if the reader is to get any reliable facts from
the report. Practically no statements explain the method used
in determining depreciation or how the reserve has been accumu-
lated. Depreciation, at the best, is aporoximate and it is only
fair that the method of its determination be explained in full.
A great number of these reports give assets at net rather than at
cost less depreciation.
The deduction from assets for depreciation, depletion,
etc. has a direct effect on the sutdIus of the company. If depre-
ciation is over-stated, surolus must be under-stated by a like
amount and vice-versa. Suppose a correct depreciation reserve of
-45-

29TH ANNUAL REPORT
EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY
1951
Consolidated Balance Sheet
December 26, 1951
-44-
EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE
ASSETS
CURRENT ASSETS:
Cash in bank and on hand $ 16,521,217.01
Marketable bonds and stocks 10,739,568.20
(at marcet value Dec. 26,
1951)
Accounts and bills receivable
(less reserve) 15,951,456.69
Inventories of raw materials,
supplies, work in process and
finished product at cost or
market, whichever is lower 5*
,
541,840. 18 $ 76,604,082.08
INVESTMENTS AND ADVANCES:
Affiliated Comoanies $ 1,752,420.21
Other 5.040,506.25 4,772,726.46
LAND, BUILDINGS, PLANT AND
MACHINERY AT COST $106,225,742.51
Less: Reserve for depreciation 56,512,663.05 69,911,059.46
GOODWILL AND PATENTS OF PARENT
COMPANY AMD SUBSIDIARIES Nil
DEFERRED CHARGES TO FUTURE OPERATIONS:
Unexpired insurance, Etc. 887,484.24
$152,175,552.24
AND SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES
SHEET, DECEMBER 2 6, 1951
LIABILITIES
CURRENT LIABILITIES:
Accounts payable, including provision
for Federal taxes $ 6,644,685.94
Notes Payable 4,000,000.00
Dividends payable:
Preferred—No. 118 of lh% $92,485.50
Common—No. 118 of $1.25
per share 2,819,956.25
Extra—No. 120 of $.75
per share 1,691,975*75 4,6o4,4l5.50 $ 15,249,099.44
GENERAL AND CONTINGENT RESERVES 5,499,029.49
CAPITAL STOCK AND PAID IN SURPLUS:
6% Cumulative Preferred Stoc'<—
$100 par value:
Authorized—100,000 shares
Issued— 61,657 shares $ 6,165,700.00
Common Stock—No par value:
Authorized—2,500,000 shares
I s sued— 2,265,150 shares
Less in Trea s. 7,185 shares
2,255,965 shares
at stated value of
$10 per share $22,559,650.00
Paid-in surplus 28,782,600.00 51,542,250.00 57,507,950.00
SURPLUS, as per annexed statement 75,919,275.51
$152,175,552.24
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$240,000.00 for a company whose balance sheet is as follows:
The Blank: Company
BALANCE SHEET
December ?l t 1952
ASSETS
Current Assets $500,000.00
Fixed Assets $850,000.00
Less— Reserve for Depreciation 600,000.00 250,000.00
Total Assets $750,000.00
LIABILITIES
Current Liabilities $150,000.00
Fixed Liabilities 50,000.00 $200,000.00
CAPITAL
Capital Stock $400,000.00
Surplus 150,000.00 550,000.00
Total Liapilitiee and Capital $750,000.00
Since the reserve is over-stated by $560,000.00 it is obvious
that surolus is under-stated by that amount and if the balance
sheet were correct, it wo dd show $510,000.00. A secret reserve
has been established by the incorrect credit to the reserve
account.
In the same case, supoose a balance sheet showing
"Reserve for Depreciation" at $100,000.00. Surolus would then
be $650,000.00 and, unless the method of determining the figure
was explained, no one reading the statement would be the wiser.
Eastman Kodalc Company does not show the amount de-
ducted for bed debts in 1951 although such a deduction is indi-
cated on the Balance Sheet (see pages 44-5). Union Tank Car
Company, June 195° (see page 47) follows the same procedure
with respect to depreciation on fixed assets and fails to show
any provision for doubtful accounts. Can it be that the total
-46-

UNION TANK CAR COMPANY
BALANCE SHEET
(Consolidated)
June 50, 1950
ASSETS
CURRENT:
Cash $ 8,255,191.40
Securities 5,920,822.71
Accounts Receivable 1,556,555.78
Materials and Supplies 471,214.18
Accrued Income and Deferred Charges 74 ,468.62 $14,276,050.69
FIXED:
Tan* Car Equipment (Less Depreciation) $55*874 ,950.82
Prooerty, Plant and Equipment (Less
Depreciation) 1,764,559.62 55,659,510.44
UNAMORTIZED DEBT (Discount) 107,007.72
$50,022,568.85
LIABILITIES, CAPITAL STOCK AND SURPLUS
CURRENT;
Accounts Payable $ 1,477,944.65
Accrued Interest 102,575.00 $ 1,580,519.65
RESERVES;
Federal Income Taxes $ 578,401.65
Miscellaneous 405,205.12 785,606.77
kh% EQUIPMENT TRUST CERTIFICATES 9,100,000.00
CAPITAL STOCK—NO PAR VALUE:
(Authorized 5,000,000 Shares)
—
Outstanding 1,254,048 Shares 51,551,200.00
SURPLUS 7,207,242.45
$50,022,568.85
At Cost or Market whichever is lower.

of $1,566,555.78 of accounts receiveble are good and expected
to be collected in full? Similarly, Liggett & Myers Tobacco
Comoany, in its balance sheet for the year ended December 51,
1951, shows "Account s Receivable $10,995,027.09" without
provision for bad debts!
Although the generally approved method of valuing
inventories is"cost or market (replacement market, not selling
price), whichever is lower," the valuation may be made on any
convenient basis to "adjust" the condition of the company. Any
mis-statement in value effects both surplus ond profits cor-
respondingly. Some instances of variation in inventory val-
uation of several corDorations are noted. Brown Shoe Company
(see pages 44-5) states that inventories are valued at the
lower of cost or market prices. Tide Water Oil ComDanv and
Subsidiaries, Consolidated Balance Sheet, June JO, 1952, shows
"Crude Oil and Products (At lower than Market) $9,511,454.82."
The reader is left to guess the cost of this item or to determine
how much lower than maricet is expressed in the figure "given.
The consolidated Balance Sheet, September JO, 1950, of the Pan-
Handle Producing and Refining Comoany and Subsidiary Companies
shows "Oil (At Market Value) $257,586.02." Can it be that
a profit has been taken on all the finished product on hand in
this company? This practice cannot be worse than failing to
indicate the :nethod of valuation of inventories as is done in
the Statement of Assets and Liabilities, December Jl, 19J0, of
the Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company (see page 49). No reader
can determine the method used in arriving at this valuation.
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PITTSBURGH PLATE GLASS COMPANY
STATEMENT OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
DECEMBER 31, 1950
Assets Liabilities
ASSETS:
Investment
Merchandise $10,512,127.26
Materiel and Working Accounte6, 578,401. 79
Bills and Accounts Receivsble9,559*855. 71
Federal Government and Other
Securities 8,026,850.25
Cash 1,988,511.70
Quick: A 8 set
s
Tressury Stock
LIABILITIES:
Capital Stock Authorized $65,000,000.00
Lees—Unissued Capital St ocklO,856 ,900. 00
$62,860,558.06
Sundry Credits:
Bills Psyable NONE
Accounts Payable—Current $ 5,005,051.70
General Insurance Reserve
Reserve for Inventory Defla-
tion, Obsolescence and Other
Contingencies
Reserve for Estimated Federal
Income Taxes Payable in 1951
PROFIT AND LOSS:
Surplus Jenusry 1, 195^
Earnings Ye?r 195°
Less:
Depreciation,
Obsolescence and
Depletion $5,928,505.09
Cash Dividends4,522,9l6.00
Federal Income
Taxes paid yesr
1950 ^n excess
of Reserve 10,192.55
Reserve for Esti-
mated Federal
Income Taxes Pay-
able in 1951 450,000.00
Balance in Surplus
December 51, 1950
$57,957,218.59
9,121,841.56
$47,059,059.95
8,711,411.44
56,465,506.69
279,284.50
$99,605,129.25
$54,165,100.00
5,005,051.70
1,582,724.97
2,058,624.07
450,000.00
58 , 547,648.51
$99,605,129.25
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The comments made on the valuation of inventories
apply with eoual force to Other assets in that any incorrect
valuation of an asset hes the sane effect on the capital sec-
tion of the balance sheet. Very little uniformity is found
in the methods of valuing assets and the method is seldom ex-
plained. Eastman Kodak: (see pages values marketable
securities and stocks at their marcet value et the time of
preparing the balance sheet; investments and advances are
divided as to "Affiliated Comoanies" and "Others" but the
amount is not explained and it is impossible to determine,
f r ?m the statement, what is jieent by "Others." The Tide
Wster Oil Company and Subsidiaries, Consolidated Balance
Sheet, June JO, 1952* shows "Securities in Escrow—at cost
(market value $561,69?. 75) $594,068.56." "Other Invest-
ments and Receivables" and "Investments in Affiliated Companies"
are shown at cost while market value is not shown. Is the
former over-valued? Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company, Balance
Sheet for the year ended December Jl, 1951* shows no valuation
methods except for inventories which are at cost. The Consol-
idated Balance Sheet of Missouri—Kansas Pipe Line Company
and Subsidiary Companies, March Jl, 1950* shows an asset account,
"Plant, Property, Contracts, Leaseholds, Etc. (including gas
purchase and sales contracts at a valuation of $1,106,250.00 of
which $880,000.00 was determined by independent engineers and
$226,250.00 by the Board of Directors) $6,265,859.57." It
is not explained why the Board of Directors determined a "write-
up" of $226,250.00 but not all companies would go so far as to
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explain that part of the figure shown ms an "arbitrary val-
uation" or that any of the amount given did not reoresent
actual cost.
The practice of showing several items in the same
account has met with general usage by many companiee—a very
unfortunate condition. Brown Shoe ComDany, October, 31> 1951
( see pages 4l-2) combines the inventories of goods in process,
raw materials, and supplies into one account while Eastman
Kodak, December 26, 1931 (see pages 44-5) combines inventories
of raw materials, work in process, and finished goods. Land,
buildings, plant, and roachinery is also combined in the latter.
The American Chicle Company, Comparative Consolidated Balance
Sheet, June JO, 1931 » groups investments with Notes Receivable
and consolidates land, buildings, r.nd machinery into one ac-
count. Chrysler Corporstion and Subsidiaries, Comparative
Consolidated Balance Sheet, September JO, 1929, groups "Land,
Buildings, Machinery, Equipment, Dies, etc." and all inventories
are in one amount.
When all inventories are found in one account it is
impossible to determine whether they consist principally of
finished goods or whether the stock of goods ready for sale is
limited while supplies are far in excess of current needs.
Land, which does not ordinarily deoreciate, should not be in-
cluded with deDreciating assets for it ie then imoossible to
determine the depreciative amount of the figure given. Assets
with different deoreciation rates must be separated if the reader
is to secure the desired informs t ion fr#m a statement. He can
-51

neither determine the amount represented by each aseet, the
adequacy of the depreciation reserve on the balance sheet, or
the propriety of the charge to current operations. It would
reouire little more effort or space on the statement to show
these items separately and the report would be much more reed-
able.
Many evils may be covered by careful selection of
names for accounts show^ on reports. A company showing "Gov-
ernment Bonds and Other Securities" in its assets at $550, 000. 00
may own $5,000.00 in government bonds end $5^5*000.00 in stocks
of some unknown company which may be virtually bankrupt. Many
vague accounts may be found in oublished balance sheets and
they mean absolutely nothing unless their content can be analyzed.
This is imoossible for the "outsider" unless an explanation is
attached. Pittsburgh Piste Glass Company, December 51, 1950
(see page 49) shows such accounts as "Investment," "Material and
Working Accounts," and "Federal Government and Other Securities"
in its assets. Eastman Kodak, December 26, 1951 C 8ee psges
5), shows "Other" under "Investments and Advances." The asset
side of the balance sheet of Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company
(see page 55) is an excellent illustration of scantiness and
vagueness. With such asset accounts as these, the most exper-
ienced ana list can determine little, if anything, of the true
financial condition of the company being studied.
Nor is this vagueness of terminology limited on the
balance sheet to assets. Tide Water Oil Company, Consolidated
Balance Sheet, June 50, 1951* shows "Reserves for Contingencies
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LIGGETT k MYERS TOBACCO COMPANY
BALANCE SHEET FOR YEAR ENDED DECEMBER Jl, 1951
ASSETS
Real Estate, Machinery and Fixtures $ 25,983,006.68
Brands, Trade-Marks and Good Will 1.00
Current:
Leaf Tobacco, Manufactured Stock
and Operating Supplies, at cost$90, 044,681. 51
Stock in Subsidiary Companies 492,585-70
Securities 4,476,164.08
Accounts Receivable 10,995,027.09
Accounts Receivable in Allied
Companies 11,995.41
Cash" 27,075,001.16
Preferred Stocks 2,480,785.00
United States, State and
Municipal Bonds 20,980,450.40 156,554,688.55
Total Assets $180,542,696.05
——$2,167,210.74.'' Eastman Kodak, December 26, 1951, (see
pages 44-5), shows. "General and Contingent Reserves——
-
$5*^99, 029. 49." It is impossible to determine whether these
accounts represent reserves for actual anticipated losses or
are used in whole, or in part, as a means of setting aside
available surplus to take care of lean years.
Many balance sheets are made unnecessarily hard to
read by the classification of accounts used. In order that
comparisons may be made easily and ratios toay be readily deter-
mined, some logical and uniform system should be followed.
On some balance sheets, securities are to be found under
current assets while others place such accounts under a separate
heading such as "Investments." No uniformity is found with
respect to reserve accounts; some showing them as liabilities
rather than as deductions from their correspond! ag asset
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accounts.. Such a practice maces it necessary for the reader
to make calculations that should be made on the statement it-
self. Depreciation must be deducted from assets against which
it aoplies before a comparison can be made between fixed assets
and fixed liabilities. If investments in affiliated coaoanies
are included with current assets, the amount must be deducted
before an accurate current ratio can be determined. This could
be eliminated if more regard were given to classifications on
the balance sheet.
PROFIT AND LOSS.—In recent years as much imDortance
has come to be attached to the profit and loss statement as
to the balance sheet. No comolete analysis can be made of a
report without both and the analyst has found that many sig-
nificant figures and comparisons can be secured from a complete
profit and loss statement. ^here he expects to find charges
for the current credits to operating reserves as well as the
income and other expense items that determine profit or loss.
General Foods Corporations and American Locomotive Company have
gone so far as to publish a profit and loss statement with no
balance sheet. This is very undesirable, however, for the balance
sheet must be used in conjunction with the profit and loss
statement if the latter is to be oroperly interoreted. Pitts-
burgh Plate Glass Company (see page 49) proposes to publish a
profit and loss statement in its report but the only actual
"Profit and Loss" a c counts given ere 11 Earni ngs Year 195°
$9*121, 841.56" and "Depreciation, Obsolescence and Depletion
35*928, 505*09" which is incorrectly deducted from earnings
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plus surplus rather than from net earnings for the year.
If depreciation is over- charged, profits will be
smaller by an equal amount while an under-charge to depreciation
over-states profits to an amount equal to the under-stat ement.
Suppose a case where net profits, before allowing for depreciation,
are $600,000.00 while depreciation is correctly determined as
$200,000.00. Net profits for the oeriod would then become
$400,000.00 but if depreciation was stated as $500,000.00, net
profit would be $500,000.00—an under-stated profit by $100,000.00.
If depreciation was erroneously determined to be $100,000.00,
net profits would show $500,000. 00--an over-statement of
$200,000.00. Since net profit (or loss) is closed directly to
surolus account, any incorrect determination of profit will
effect surplus in the same manner and to an equal extent; if
profits are over-stated by $200,000.00, surplus will be over-
stated by $200,000.00, aside from other inconsistencies that may
affect it.
For a profit and loss statement to be of any great value
to a reader, it must show, at a minimum; gross sales, net sales,
cost of goods sold (how determined), operating and selling ex-
penses, depreciation charges, financial income, and financial
expenses. Practically no published statements are complete in
all of these details and many, in their last analysis, show nothing.
American Locomotive Company an': Subsidiaries, Consolidated Income
Account (see page 56) shows only "Net Loss from Operations" and
11 Depreciation on Plant and Equipment." General Foods Corporation
and Subsidiary Companies, Profit and Loss Statement, year ending
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CONSOLIDATED INCOME AND SURPLUS
ACCOUNTS
AMERICAN LOCOMOTIVE COMPANY AND SUBSIDIARIES
For the six months ended
JUNE 50, 1952
CONSOLIDATED INCOME ACCOUNT
NET LOSS FROM OPERATIONS, after deducting manufacturing,
maintenance and administrative expenses $ 1,225,220.65
DEPRECIATION ON PLANTS AND EQUIPMENT 7^6,612.45
DEFICIT FOR THE SIX MONTHS ft 1,971,855-08
CONSOLIDATED SURPLUS ACCOUNT
SURPLUS, December 51, 1951
DEFICIT FOR THE SIX MONTHS ENDED June 50, 1952
DIVIDENDS—Preferred Stock
SURPLUS, June 50, 1952
Earned Surplus
Capital SurDlus
16,656,161.81
776,708.07
$20,661,195.96
1,971,855.08
$18,689,562.©8
1,256,495.00
$17,^52,869.88
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GENERAL FOODS CORPORATION
and Subsidiary Companies
PROFIT AND LOSS STATEMENT
Fourth Quarter Ending December 51» 1951
Gross Profits from Operations $12,859,421
Selling, Distributing, Administrative, and General
Expenses and Other Charges 8,745,019
$ 4,096,402
Provision for Depreciation 652 ,557
Balance $ 5*465,865
Add Miscellaneous Income 251, 167
Total Income $ 5,715,052
Provision for Income Taxes (Credit to correct reserve) 5Q>884
Net Profits $ 5,745,916
Year Ending December 51, 1951
Gross Profits from Operations $58,998,990
Selling, Distributing, Administrative, and General
Expenses and Other Charges 57>575»519
$21,625,471
Provision for Depreciation 2
,
520,865
Balance $19,504,606
Add Miscellaneous Income 850, 555
$20,154,959
Provision for Income Taxes 2,001,240
$18,155,719
Equals $5.44 per share on 5,275,667 shares of no par common stock
outstanding December 51» 1951« This is comparable with $19,085,595
for 1950 equivalent to $5.65 per share on 5,256,845 shares out-
standing December 51 > 1950*
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December Jl, 1951 (see page 57), groups "Selling, Distributing,
Admini strat ive, end General Expenses and Other Charges," with very
little other information being shown. In the entire report (no
balance sheet), they do not bother with showing "cents" at all—
"dollars" is near enough! And the statement becomes entirely
unreadable when it is noted that, to arrive at "Net Profit" for
the period (quarter ending December 51, 1951) > an addition of
"Provision for Income Taxes (Credit to correct reserve)
$50,8SA n is made to "Total Income." Just what this means, no
"reader" can possibly determine. In the statement for the
year ending December Jl, 1951 » an item with the same name is
deducted. The amount shown as "Net Profits" in the former is
proper only if this provision for Income Taxes was included in
some preceeding item. At the best, the two statements are not
consistent and much is left to the imagination of the person
reading the statement. Can he be expected to guess correctly
in all instances?
Brown Shoe Company, Inc. and Subsidiary Companies,
Statement of consolidated surplus for the year ended October
51, 1951 shows "Cost of Material, Labor, Manufacturing Expense,
and Selling, Administrative and General Expense, including
Depreciation, Interest Charges, and Bad Debts" as a deduction
from net sales.
The Income Statement of the Union Tank Car Company is
given as an illustration of the type of profit and loss state-
ment submitted to the stockholder and investor. It is not an
exception but is the rule! It will be noted that the first
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UNION TANK CAR COMPANY
INCOME STATEMENT
(consolidated)
Six Months Ended June 50, 1950
Profit from Ooerations (After
Depreciation) $1,588,178.82
Other Income 240,957.42 $1,629,116.24
Interest on Equipment Trust Cer-
tificates and Other Deductions $ 250,505.81
Federal Income Taxes, estimated 158,956 . 59 589,442.20
Net Income, Six Months ended June 50, 1950 $1,259,674.04
Surplus, January 1, 1950 6,970,806.81
$8,210,480.85
Dividends Paid 1,005,253.40
Surplus, June 50, 1950 $7,207,242.45
account is "Profit from Operations (After Depreciation)" and
that no basic figures are given. Little more is icnown after
the statement is studied than before.
Eastman Kodak: Company and Subsidiary Companies,
Consolidated Statement of Profit end Lose and Surplus for the
Year Ending December 26, 1951, shows only net income, "Other
Income," depreciation charge, "Other Charges (net)," provision
for income taxes, and a deduction from net profit, "Excess of
cost over tangible assets at acquisition of subsidiary companies
wholly acquired during the year $5,717,074.22." Does not
this charge represent purchased goodwill rather then a charge
against net profit for the period? The amount paid for sub-
sidiaries must have been represented by value! Is there not a
secret reserve created?
Tide Water Oil Company and Subsidiaries, Consolidated
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Surplus Account for the Six Months Ended June 50, 1952, has a
charge to surplus: "Revaluation of as pete and write-off of
unrecoverable and intangible items approved by the Board of
Directors May 5, 195? $17,815,525.00." No explanation ia
made as to the amount representing asset revaluation or what
other items were affected although a footnote to the balance
sheet states thst affect is given to the "revaluation and write-
off" on that statement.
In an editorial appearing in The Magazine of Wall
Street, several interesting incidents concerning mis-stated
earnings are reported: B. F. Goodrich Co. , 1926, transferred
$5,000,000.00 from a reserve account to show total income of
$8,040,000.00 before bond interest was deducted: the eame year
U. S. Rubber Company transferred $5,000,000.00 from plantation
operations to profit and reported earnings of $4.50 per share
whereas "common stock lacked earning power"; Baldwin Locomotive,
1926, credited profits with $7,500,000.00 which was received
from foreign governments and covered five years operations;
Manhattan Electrical Supply Company, 1926, made 8 current credit
amounting to $12.00 per share extra profit from the sale of its
battery business.^"
As long as American Corporations are allowed to pub-
lish 6uch reports, without protest, ee are generally received
by stockholders end the public, there will remain a condition
of "ignorance of ownership" and the investor cannot hops to
1. April 9, 1927—Alice in Financial Wonderland, p. 1125-6.
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obtain an accurate knowledge of the business using his capital.
He must still guess to the best of his ability pnd hoDe that
all is well while relying on the reputation of the company in
which his money is investpd.
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CONCLUSION
ATTEMPTED REMEDIES.—So little has actually been ac-
complished by virtue of remedies that have been attempted, as
compared with the extent of the problem of ownership without either
control or knowledge and its corrollary, uninf ormative reports,
that they deserve little consideration in the future. They have
helped, no doubt, in sojie cases end jiay have exerted an influence
in keeping the general condition from becoming worse than is found
at present but, by their evident lack of solution, they are proven
to be entirely inadequate to cope with the situation and little
time need be eoent with them. However, it seems that several of
the more important and more widely recognized attempts to "give
the stockholder a chance" should be mentioned and criticized
briefly.
Cumulative voting has oerhaps done more to bring rep-
resentation and information to the minority stockholder than any
other one exDedient found in American finance. By its use, the
minority stockholder is sble to secure representation on the board
of directors of his corporation provided his holdings are signif-
i cant.
By "cumulative voting" is meant the authority, not to
cast only one vote for esch share of stock held as is the case
without the cumulative provision, but to cast as many votes as
the product of the number of sharee held multiplied by the number
of directors to be elected. Thus, if stockholder A owns 100
voting shares and there are ten directors to be elected, A has
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1000 votes which my all be voted for one director or may be
apportioned between two or more directors as A sees fit. If
there are not more than 1000 shares of voting stock outstanding,
A ie assured of eocuring the election of one director if his votes
are concentrated to that end.
With representation on the board of directors, minority
\itereste have a means of obtaining information even though their
representative is out-numbered and may be over-ruled at meetings
of the board. It is an advantage to be represented and have a
source of information even though no great degree of control ie
possible. There is someone on the inside to suoervise the inter-
ests of the minority.
Cumulative voting has fallen short in several particulars.
It i6 not a right of the stockholder unless it is so provided by
state statute, charter, or by-lawa of the corooration. This makes
it operative in comparatively few cases since states have not
generally made the provision compulsory and few corporations have
voluntarily endowed their stockholders with this extra privilege.
Furthermore, it is of no value to a stockholder who does not hold
a percentage of the stock large enough to elect a director--he
seldom personally votes his stock in any case for proxies are
often more convenient.
Various classes of stock have been given the right
to elect soecified numbers on the board of directors. Thus, if
there are three classes of stock issued and outstanding, each
class: may be permitted to elect, let ue say, three directors.
Although "Class C" stock may represent only ten per cent, of total
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stock outstanding, Class C stockholders are represented equally
with Class A and Class B stock on the bosrd. But this still
gives no advantage to the small stockholder «?nd the "would-be
investor" is entirely without means of obtaining information
about the company in which he is interested.
Voting trusts, whereby stock is concentrated in the
hands of a trustee to be voted, have been used as a means of
obtaining reoreeent «ti on and control. Voting trusts have not
only failed to secure relief but have proven to be a tendency in
the opposite direction in manv instances. They have come into
such general ill-repute that, "The highest court in Illinois
condemned then unoualifiedly as illegal arrangements."
^
PROPOSED REMEDIES.—As a means of securing adequate
reports, it has become customary in England for the auditor of
a company to be elected by the stockholders. The adoption of
thie practice in America would undoubtedly meet with the approval
of minority stoccholders and, with several additions to the English
practice, would serve a dire need. The stockholder would then be
furnished with reliable information and enough facts could be demand-
ed so that published reports would be true financial statements in-
stead of blotter-like pamphlets or advertisements of the comoany.
A provision would, of course, be necessary whereby the election
of the auditor by the stockholders would be compulsory by statute
rather than optional to the corooration if any gre ct benefit is to
be derived from such a practice. Coroorations have reached the
place where they must be governed by requirement rather than by
1. Saliers, Earl A.—Accountant's Handbook, p. 195.
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their oDtion as has too often been the unfortunate condition in
the past.
To be of any consequence, such a practice would have to
incorporate some definite resoonaibility on the auditor in question.
All auditors, although they may be public accountants and be
appointed to serve the stockholders, are not of the highest moral
character. They might be influenced by the management of the
comoany under audit to submit reoorts for "inside interests" or to
neglect their duty of thorough examination. To insure the prooer
work of a stockholders' auditor, it would be necessary to bring
some force to bear on him. This might be done by making it a
felony for any auditor to make a false or misleading reoort and to
bar him from practice thereafter. Unless some such provision were
made end enforced, little weight could be attached to the reports
of the auditor even though he were elected by the stockholders,
Any management, with the support of dishonest stockholders could,
in many cases, influence the election of incompetent and untrust-
worthy auditors who could be controlled by the management. There
would arisp a situation of "dummy" auditors which would be no
better if as good as the present system.
Another important provision must be added to the English
practice if it is to be complete. "The British practice as to in-
dependent audit is confined entirely to the telance sheet. . . .
There is in England no indeoendent audit of the income account. "2
Any audit must, to be complete, be a "detailed audit" and must
2. Ripley, William Z.—Wall Street and Main Street, p. lA2.
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include the orofit and lose statement ae well as the balance sheet.
Comment is made in section IV of this study (p. 5A-60) on the
importance of an adequate profit snd loss state ent to sccormsny
p balance sheet. To be adequate, it must oe subjec^ to the sane
scrutiny and detail as the balance sheet.
It is seen from the above that any provision of this
kind would reouire federal suoervis?on for state statutes could
not be exoected to provide uniform treatment under their present
system of competition for the right to grant corporation charters.
Such provision would not be passed unanimously by the several
states nor would the same degree of control be provided in the
states giving it favorable consideration. There would only be
presented another means for encouraging ''charter mongering" among
the states practicing this art.
A "Uniform Corporations Act," similar to the present
Uniform Sales Act or the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act,
could be so drawn as to correct most, if not all, of the present
coroorate abuses but it would meet with the same trouble as
have the two acts mentioned— it would not be immediately passed
by all the states. Those states not passing such an act would
be given a marked advantage over states in which it was passed
and, with the present system, the e would be little incentive
for its favorable consideration by many states. The right to
grant charters has proven far too profits cle to such states as
Delaware and New Jersey for them to be favorably impressed by
any act that would place them on an equal basis with other states
in the competitive field of granting charters to new corporations.
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Only by some drastic federal action could such an act secure
serious consideration in these states.
Many provisions may be nointed out for inclusion in
such an set end means might be provided wherebv states would be
almost compelled to adopt the act. Theee provisions and the
means of compelling t->eir adoption would be practically iden-
tical with those necessary under a requirement for providing
federal grants of corporation charters and will be discussed
in that connection.
The only complete end efficient way of providing a
r;or cable solution to the many problems connected with corporate
organization and control seems to be through federal statutes.
To be pure, there will be complaints from states when the right
to grant charters is removed from them and there is the question
of constitutionality but several methods may be suggested to
overcome this problem.
"It has at various times been suggested that con-
gress, without violating the United States Constitution,
can force federal incoroorat i -in through any one or all
of the following methods:
"(--) By excluding from the chsnnels of inter-
state commerce the articles manufactured or otherwise
produced by state corporations.
"(2) By prohibiting all corporations not chartered
by congress from engaging in interstate commerce.
"(5) By laying a prohibitive tax upon the inter-
state business transacted by state-chartered corporations.
n K^) By denying the use of the mails to state cor-
porations thst engage in interstate commerce."
5
Any one of these me+hods would sorve the desired purpose for few
corporations which do not enga e in interstate commerce are
5. Stoclcder, Archibald H.—Business Ownership Organization,
p. 456.
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large enough to require drastic methods of control. They are,
for the most part, closely held and all the stockholders ere on
the "inside." Chartering rights would still remain with individua
states but coroorsti one operating under sta + e charters would, of
necessity, be small for they could net transact business outside
the parent state. This would keep the federal government^ from
being bothered with great numbers of small corooration9 as would
be the case if all corporations were reauired to obtain federal
charters. Also, there would remain no advantage in maintaining
lax charter laws on the state statutes since only state corpo-
rations could be chartered and we would see much better laws
on the state records. On the other hand, such a restriction
would be placed on + he majority of large corporations acting
under state statutes that they would be oractically comnelled
to orocurc- federal charters.
The first consideration of any future legislation con-
cerning coroorations should be orovision for Drotection of mi- -
nority interests. There should be orotection against the pos-
sibility of + he issue of stock at a price below true value.
This would change the present provision of reouiring par value
stocc to be sold at not less than par and would consider sctual
value rather than the fiction of per value. Stoc< issues for
property and services warrant a closer scrutiny than has been
generally accorded such transactions.
Each charter, or the b\'-laws of every corooration,
should BDecify the amount of fixed liabilities the company may
incur and should provide for salaries of officers and executives
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as well as state the proportion of earnings to be carried to
surplus after dividends are declared and the maximum accumulated
surplus to be held in the company.
Provision for determining deoreciation end valuing
intangible assets should be set forth in the by-laws. Allowance
for the creation of reserves should be determined and explained
and definite rules should be formulated in each charter for the
acquisition and control of subsidiary companies.
Certificates of stock ownership should be reruired to
contain a detailed descriotion of the rights and liabilities at-
tached to + he holders of such stock. Anyone purchasing stock would
be given constructive notice of his particular position with ref-
erence to the company and other steccholders upon the acquisition
of stock.
The influence of the Intersta+e Commerce Commission
on enterprises under its regulation indicates what can be accom-
plished by federal regulation of all large corporations. The
authority of this agency might be extended to cover the acts
of all corooretions coming under federal control by virtue of
this suggestion. There might be a new department created to be
known by such a name as "The Corporation Commission" to inspect
a id regulate these companies or the Federal ^rade Commission
might be given that capacity. "Let the word go forth that the
Federal Trade Commission is henceforward to addrese itself vigor-
ously to the matter of intelligent corDorate publicity, and, with
the helpful agencies already et work, the thing is ss good as done."
4. Ripley, William Z. --Stop, Look, Listen! Atlantic Monthly,
September, 1926, p. 593.
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Under whatever department this function should fall, its duties
and responsibilities must be well-defined and active sunervielon
must be provided.
Federal regulation of any kind must bring with it the
use of uniform accounts by corporations under its supervision.
Records must be kept as prescribed by the governing commission
for its inspection end for preparation of reports required by
the commission. But the mere use of these accounts and the prep-
aration of statements to be presented to the commission from them
is not enough. The stockholder and investor will be little better
informed than before unless the published reports of the corporation
are required to be identical with those oresented to the commission.
The real need is for informative published reports and provision
for such, at least annually, is necessary under any adequate system
of regulation. This might easily be included in the statutes and
it would be well to do so.
With the stockholder and investor receiving reports which
actually give information, their necessary interest and support
will naturally follow. The information has always been desired
but existing conditions have numbed this desire by so completely
failing to satisfy it that the oublic stockholder has almost lost
heart and his complaints are scarcely audible among the roars of
11 competitive reasons" by corporate managements. Once the stock-
holder finds that facts can be had and the interest of capital is
whole-heartedly solicited, this interest will find expression.
"Prosperity, not real but soecious, may indeed be unduly protracted
by artificial means, but in the end the truth is bound to prevail.
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Nor can the truth wore harm to those whose custom it ie to worlc
in daylight. It is the wrongdoer elone, delving- in dar'-cness and
diligent in deviousness, who fears the strong tonic of publicity."
5. Ripley, William Z.— op. cit., p. 552-5.
-71-

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bonbright, Jaaiee C.—Railroad Caoite lization. The Columbia
University Press, 1920.
Bonbright, Jamee C—No-Par Stock: Its Economic and Legtl
Aspects. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Msy 1920, p.
440-65.
Bonneville, Joseph Howard—Elements of Business Finance, p.
75-106. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1927.
Brundage, Percival F.—Some Shortcomings in Consolidated State-
ments. The Journal of Accountancy, October 1950* P« 285-92.
Brundage, Percival F.—Treatment of No-Par-Value Stock in New
York, New Jersey and Massachusetts. The Journal of Account-
ancy, April, 1926, p. 241-56.
Eush, Irving T.—High Finance Must Be Honest. The Magazine
of Wall Street, December 28, 1929, p. 557-3+
.
Campbell, James M.—Wanted—A New Kind of Annual Report.
Advertising And Selling, August 10, 1927, P« 54+.
Clews, Henry—Fifty Years in Wall Street, p. 209-5?; 5?7-75;
619-58; 807-21; 1045-60. Irving Publishing Company, 1908.
Couchman, Charles B.—Juggling Corporate Capital. Nation's
Business, November, 1929, p. 45-5+.
Dicoee, L. R. --Published Balance Sheets and Window Dressing.
Paper Trade Journal, August 26, 1926, p. 59-6?.
Durand, John—How to Read an Incoae Statement. The Magazine
of Wall Street, May 7, 1927, p. 48-9+.
Durand, John—How to Read a Balance Sheet. The Magazine of
Wall Street, May 21, 1927, p. 124-5*. .
Editoria 1--A lice in Financial Wonderland. The Magazine of
Wall Street, April 9, 1927, p. 1070-1+.
Editorial--Industry' s Silent Partners. World's Wore, January
16, 1952, p. 29-51+.
Editorial—Wanted—A Guardian for the Small Stockholder. The
Literary Digest, December IP, 1925, p. 86-7.
Flynn, John T.—Up and Down With Sam Insull. Colliers, Dec-
ember 17, 1952, p. 20- If.
Flynn, John T.—Why Corporations Leave Home. The Atlantic
Monthly, September 1952, p. 263-76.
-72-

Greendlinger , Leo—Financial Business Statements. Alexander
Hamilton Institute, 1919.
Greendlinger, Leo—Financing. Alexander Hamilton Institute,
1927.
Greene, Thomas L.—Corporation Finance, p. 80-145. Putnam,
1897.
Haney, Lewie H.—Business Organization and Combination. The
Macmillan Company, 1919, P. 564-415.
Hatfield, Henry Rand—Accounting: Its Principles and Problems.
D. Appleton and Company, 1927.
Havener, Paul—Analysis of Financial Statements, p. 5^9-6 5
•
The Journal of Accountancy, May 1917*
Homberger, Donald J.—Some Aspects of Reserve Accounting.
American Association of University Instructors in Accounting,
June 1924, p. 81-85.
Hurdman, Frederick, H.—No Par Value Stock:. The Journal of
Accountancy, February, 1924, p. 91-100.
Hurdman, Frederic'-c H.--Some Questions on No-Par-Valve Ftic'c.
The Journal of Accountancy, January, 1925, p. 9-18.
Jones, Kenneth V.—The Management and the Complaining Stock-
holder. The Magazine of Wall Street, August 27, 1927, p.
750-2+.
Lasser, J. K.—What Do You Tell Your Stockholders? System,
June, 19^0, p. 5^9f.
Leake, P. D.—Commercial Goodwill, p. 77-95* Sir Isaac Pit-
man & Sons, Ltd.
Lough, William H.—Business Finance, p. 499-515. The Ronald
Press Company.
Lough, William H.—Corporation Finance, p. 55-78; 254-5j 549-
95. The Ronald Press Company, 1917*
Lyon, W. Hastings—Corporation Finance, p. 77-108. Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1916.
McKinsey, James 0.—Managerial Accounting, p. 154-270. The
University of Chicago Press, 1925.
Means, Gardiner C.—The Separation of Ownership and Control
in American Industry. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Nov-
ember, 1951, p. 68-100.
-75-

Olson, Lyle H.—Why the Investor Should Knew All About Fixed
Assets. Forbes, November 1, 1926, p. 17-8+
.
Parker, Harold G.—Needs of Investors With Respect to Corpora-
tion Statistics. The Journal of the American Statistical
Association, March, 1950, P> 15~7»
Parker, Seymour—Writ Lng Off Goodwill. The Journal of Account-
ancy, July, 1917, p. 62-4.
Payne, Will—Owners and Voters. The Saturday Evening Post,
August 25, 1928, p. 25*.
Richardson, A. P.—A Dangerous Development of Corporation Laws.
The Journal of Accountancy, June 1929, p. 445~8.
Ripley, William Z.—From Main Street To Wall Street. Atlantic
Monthly, January 1926, p. 94-108.
Ripley, William Z.—Rsilroads: Finance and Organization, p. 1-
105; 198-250; 412-55. Longioans, Green and Company, 1915.
Ripley, William Z.—Remedies for Eradicating Big Business Evils
World's Work, December, 1926, p. 128-58.
Ripley, Willism Z.--Stop, Look, ListenJ Atlantic Monthly,
September 1926, p. 580-99.
Ripley, William Z. —Wall Street and Main Street. Little, Brown
and Company, 1927.
Robbins, Carl, B.—No-Par Stoc<. The Ronald Press Company,
1927.
Rolnik, Max—Stock Buyers Search For Hidden Profits. The
Magazine of Wall Street, July 27, 1929, p. 582-5f.
Rukeyser
,
Merryle Stanley—The Bunco Game of Hidden Assets.
The Nation, May 22, 1929, p. 610-11.
Saliers, Earl A.—Accountant 1 8 Handbook, p. 24-3; 51; 192-215;
254-545; 471-521; 556-7; 566-91; 850-5. The Ronald Preas,
1925.
Seltzer, Lawrence, H.—A Financial History of the American
Automobile, p. 228; 240-7. Haughton Mifflin Company, 1928.
Stevens, W. H. S.—Stockholders' Voting Rights and the Centra-
lization of Voting Control. The Quarterly Journal of Economics
p. 552-92.
Stockder, Archibald H.—Business Ownershio Orgs :iization, p. 176'
7; 407-57. H. Holt and Company, 1922.
-74-

Stoc'tcwell, Herbert G.--How to Read A Financial Statement. The
Ronald Press Company, 1925.
Walicer, William H.—Corporation Finance, p. 190-205; 221-40.
Alexander Hamilton Institute, 1917.
Walton Accounting Series—Advanced Accounting, Lectures 8, 10,
20, 52, jb, 55; Supplementary Lecture 55.
Weissman, Rudolph L.—Minority Stockholders. The American
Mercury, May 1950, p. 28+.
Yntema , T. 0.—Criteria of Balance Sheet Valuation. American
Association of University Instructors in Accounting, December,
1925, p. 18-25.
-75-







